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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: STRATEGIES, CRITIQUES, AND A
PATHWAY TOWARD EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL
RIGHTS
MATTHEW J. CRON, ARASH JAHANIAN, QUSAIR MOHAMEDBHAI, AND
SIDDHARTHA H. RATHODt
ABSTRACT
This Article begins by providing an overview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
municipal liability. It discusses the specific types of municipal liability
claims, focusing on Tenth Circuit jurisprudence. The Article also dis-
cusses effective strategies that plaintiffs should utilize to prevail on mu-
nicipal liability claims. Finally, the Article proposes a relaxation of the
onerous legal standards for municipal liability claims in order to fulfill
the remedial purpose of § 1983.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services,' it is well settled that municipalities can be sued
for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 However, the Mo-
nell Court declined to enunciate "the full contours of municipal liability
under § 1983," leaving that effort for "another day."3 Thirty-five years
later, the "contours of municipal liability" remain ill-defined.4 But the
Supreme Court has made at least one thing clear: plaintiffs that bring
municipal liability claims will not have an easy go of it.
Although proving municipal liability can sometimes be demonstrat-
ed fairly easily, for example when an official municipal policy directly
causes a constitutional injury, such cases are rare because municipalities
do not often announce and enforce policies that are facially unconstitu-
tional. Rather, as more often is the case, plaintiffs must show that the
alleged injury was caused by a municipality's unwritten policy or by
municipal inaction. In such cases, proving municipal liability is "excep-
tionally difficult ' 5 because the Supreme Court has instituted "rigorous
standards of culpability and causation ... to ensure that the municipality
is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee."
6
Regardless of whether one agrees with the current approach to mu-
nicipal liability, 7 the result is that courts rarely find municipalities liable
under § 1983.8 These onerous legal standards have the predictable conse-
1. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ("Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government
units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.").
2. The term "municipality" refers to all "[1]ocal governing bodies." Id. Further, a suit against
an official in his or her official capacity is considered the same as a suit against a municipality itself.
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).
3. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
4. As one commentator observes, "[A] generation of lawyers and judges has struggled to fit
particular cases within the pigeonholes carved out by the handful of municipal 'policy' cases the
Court has fortuitously chosen to decide." Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscov-
ering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 21 (2000). The Supreme
Court has itself recognized that its jurisprudence in this area "manifestly needs clarification." City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988).
5. Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1913, 1920-21 (2007).
6. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
7. Compare John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 68 (1998) (arguing that the "current law [of municipal liability] seems.., basically
sound"), with Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort
Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1755 (1989) (criticizing municipal liability law as
having the "principal consequence" of "deny[ing] citizens recoveries against local governments for
damage caused by officials' constitutional violations").
8. See infra app. 1. Of the thirty-six Tenth Circuit cases charted, the plaintiff had prevailed in
the district court in only four of the cases. See generally Bass v. Pottawatomie Cnty. Pub. Safety
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quence of discouraging plaintiffs from pursuing municipal liability
claims. However, there are a number of considerations that should en-
courage plaintiffs to be vigilant in prosecuting civil rights claims against
municipalities. This Article intends to provide a comprehensive discus-
sion of the importance and benefits of Monell claims from the perspec-
tive of practicing civil rights attorneys.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the current standards
for municipal liability, drawing primarily on Tenth Circuit law.9 It dis-
cusses the different types of municipal liability claims and the idiosyn-
crasies of each. Part II provides guidance on how to persuasively present
municipal liability claims to courts. Part III demonstrates how municipal
liability legal standards are overly restrictive and discourage plaintiffs
from bringing municipal liability claims. It explains that although bring-
ing municipal liability claims may not always lead to greater financial
gain for plaintiffs, prosecuting such claims serves social justice aims that
often outweigh the result of an individual case.
Ultimately, given the importance of municipal liability claims as a
means not only to remedy constitutional violations but also to prevent
further violations, this Article urges plaintiffs to vigorously pursue such
claims where available. Further, this Article advocates for reforming
municipal liability jurisprudence in order to encourage rather than dis-
suade plaintiffs from seeking redress for constitutional violations causal-
ly linked to municipalities.
I. SECTION 1983 AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
A. Overview of§ 1983 and Elements of a Municipal Liability Claim
To bring a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,10 a plaintiff must allege
that some person has deprived him or her of a federal right and that such
person acted under color of state law when depriving him or her of that
right. Prior to Monell, the Supreme Court had held that municipalities
could not be sued under § 1983 because they were not "persons" within
Ctr., 425 F. App'x 713 (10th Cir. 2011); J.M. ex rel Morris v. Hilidale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-29,
397 F. App'x 445 (10th Cir. 2010); Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2,
523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008); Zuniga v. City of Midwest City, 68 F. App'x 160 (10th Cir. 2003).
Only Bass and JM were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
9. See infra app. 1.
10. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be shbjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
11. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
2014]
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the meaning of the statute.'2 Undertaking a "fresh analysis" of the legis-
lative history, the Court in Monell determined that "Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included among
those persons to whom § 1983 applies."' 3 Thus, the Court held that mu-
nicipalities "can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory,
or injunctive relief"
' 14
However, the Monell Court significantly narrowed the reach of its
holding by declaring that "a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."15 As this Article will demon-
strate, the federal courts' unyielding fidelity to this rule against re-
spondeat superior liability has led it to formulate far more burdensome
standards.
Broadly speaking, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements to establish
municipality liability. First, as is true for any claim brought pursuant to
§ 1983, the plaintiff must prove the deprivation of a federal right by a
person acting under color of state law.16 Second, the plaintiff must show
"the existence of a municipal policy or custom. ' 17 Third, the plaintiff
must demonstrate a "direct causal link between the policy or custom and
the injury alleged."'18 And, most onerously, the Tenth Circuit has recently
stated that "the Supreme Court require[s] a plaintiff to show that the
12. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Supreme Court affirmed and extended Monroe several times prior
to reversing itself in Monell. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (applying Monroe to
counties); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973) (holding that Monroe protects munic-
ipalities from injunctions as well as damages). Importantly, however, Monroe greatly expanded the
breadth of § 1983 by holding that plaintiffs could employ § 1983 to remedy constitutional injuries
inflicted by local officials whose "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law [was] made
possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law." Monroe, 365
U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
13. Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, 690.
14. Id. at 690.
15. Id. at 691. Respondeat superior is "[tihe doctrine holding an employer or principal liable
for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agen-
cy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (9th ed. 2009). The Monell Court reasoned that the legislative
history and text of § 1983 imposed a causation requirement that exempted municipalities from
respondeat superior liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. There is significant scholarly debate over
whether the Monell Court's analysis on the issue of respondeat superior liability is correct. See
David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2183, 2248 (2005) (concluding that
"the Monell doctrine should be overruled" on the issue of respondeat superior liability). Further, as
Achtenberg notes, four Supreme Court Justices "have called for reexamination of Monell's conclu-
sion that [municipalities] are exempt from respondeat superior liability." Id. at 2184-85.
16. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam) ("[l]f the [employ-
ee] inflicted no constitutional injury on respondent, it is inconceivable that [the city] could be liable
to respondent."); Huntley v. City of Owasso, 497 F. App'x 826, 832-33 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming
summary judgment to the defendant city where the court found that the city's officers had committed
no constitutional violation); Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) ("A
municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of
its officers.").
17. Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010).
18. Id.
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[municipal] policy was enacted or maintained with deliberate indiffer-
ence to an almost inevitable constitutional injury."' 19
The following challenged practices may constitute official munici-
pal policy or custom:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom
amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well
settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3)
the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the
ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions-and the ba-
sis for them-of subordinates to whom authority was delegated sub-
ject to these policymakers' review and approval; or (5) the failure to
adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure re-
sults from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.
20
This municipal policy or custom requirement is "intended to distinguish
acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
thereby make[s] clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible.' 'zi
If a plaintiff can establish the existence of a municipal policy or
custom, the plaintiff must then show that "the challenged policy or prac-
tice [was] 'closely related to the violation of the plaintiffs federally pro-
tected right.' 22 In other words, the municipality's policy or custom must
19. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013)
(citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)); see also Cacioppo v. Town of
Vail, 528 F. App'x 929, 931 32 (10th Cir. 2013). Relying on Brown, the court in Schneider ob-
served that "the prevailing state-of-mind standard for a municipality is deliberate indifference re-
gardless of the nature of the underlying constitutional violation." Schneider, 717 F.3d at 771 n.5.
However, Brown held only that "deliberate indifference" was necessary in cases where the plaintiff
proceeds "on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a
plaintiffs rights." Brown, 520 U.S. at 407; see also id. at 405 (noting that the strict "deliberate
indifference" element must be established only in cases "[w~here a plaintiff claims that the munici-
pality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so"). In
situations where a plaintiff claims that a municipality's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker
directly caused a constitutional injury, "proof that the municipality's decision was unconstitutional
... sufficels] to establish that the municipality itself [is] liable." Id. at 406. Thus, it appears that the
Tenth Circuit overstated the Supreme Court's holding in Brown.
20. Bryson, 627 F.3d at 788 (alteration omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The fifth category is more accurately described in broader terms as a category of municipal
inaction, as it is not limited to situations where the municipality has failed to train or supervise its
employees. See, e.g., Cacioppo, 528 F. App'x at 933 (discussing municipal liability claims based on
inadequate hiring, inadequate training, and ratification); Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (discussing a
municipal liability claim based on deficiencies in the police department's hiring process); J.M. ex
rel. Morris v. Hilldale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-29, 397 F. App'x 445, 456 (10th Cir. 2010) (discuss-
ing a municipal liability claim based on a school district's practice of failing to investigate sexual
harassment allegations).
21. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479
(1986)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
22. Id (quoting MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
§ 7.12[B] (2014).
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have been the "moving force" behind the constitutional injury.23 This
causation element is especially rigorous when the municipal policy or
custom is not facially unconstitutional, such as claims "based upon inad-
equate training, supervision, and deficiencies in hiring."
24
The standard for deliberate indifference is satisfied when "the mu-
nicipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act
is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it con-
sciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.25 The
stated rationale for this standard is again to avoid collapsing municipal
liability into respondeat superior liability.26 In many cases, a plaintiff
proves that the municipality was on notice by demonstrating the exist-
ence of a pattern of tortious conduct.27 However, deliberate indifference
can also be established absent a pattern of tortious conduct "if a violation
of federal rights is a 'highly predictable' or 'plainly obvious' conse-
quence of a municipality's action or inaction, such as when a municipali-
ty fails to train an employee in specific skills needed to handle recurring
situations, thus presenting an obvious potential for constitutional viola-
tions. 28
B. Specific Types of Municipal Liability Claims
1. A Formal Regulation or Policy Statement
Under the "formal regulation or policy statement" theory of relief, a
municipality is responsible for a constitutional injury when the injury
was directly caused by an official policy adopted by the municipality's
lawmakers.29 Monell itself was such a case. In Monell, a class of female
employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Ed-
ucation of New York City alleged "that the Board and the Department
had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take
unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical
reasons."30 Thus, the Monell plaintiffs challenged a formal policy that,
when implemented, necessarily caused a violation of their right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In such situations, "fault
23. Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 404) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, § 7.12[A]) (internal quotation mark omitted).
25. Bryson, 627 F.3d at 789 (quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir.
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Brown, 520 U.S. at 415.
27. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307.
28. Id. at 1308 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409).
29. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ("Local governing bodies ...
can be sued directly under § 1983 ... where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers.").
30. Id. at 660-61.
[Vol. 91:3
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and causation [are] obvious" and a plaintiff must prove only that he offi-
cial policy is unconstitutional.31
Claims proceeding under a formal policy theory of municipal liabil-
ity are relatively unusual,32 but there are several illustrative examples
found in the Tenth Circuit. In Christensen v. Park City Municipal
Corp.,33 the Tenth Circuit considered whether a municipality was liable
for its police officers' enforcement of ordinances that prohibited the
plaintiff from displaying and selling his artwork in a public park.34 Re-
versing the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs municipal liability
claim, the Tenth Circuit explained that "[i]f a governmental entity makes
and enforces a law that is unconstitutional as applied, it may be subject to
liability under § 1983."35 After the case was remanded to the district
court, a jury ultimately returned a verdict finding that the municipality
had violated the plaintiffs First and Fourth Amendment rights.
36
In Lopez v. LeMaster,37 the plaintiff suffered an assault at the hands
of other inmates.38 The plaintiff claimed that Jackson County, Oklahoma,
maintained a policy of understaffing its jails, which resulted in his inju-
ry.39 In reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant municipality, the Tenth Circuit explained that "the existence of
an official municipal policy which itself violated federal law" satisfies
the plaintiffs burden "as to culpability, and the heightened standard ap-
plicable to causation for unauthorized actions by a municipal employee
will not apply.
40
2. Decisions by Final Policymakers
A municipality can also be held liable for constitutional injuries re-
sulting from the decisions or conduct by "decisionmaker[s] possess[ing]
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the [com-
plained of] action. '41 In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,42 the plaintiff
31. Brown, 520 U.S. at 406; see also Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to Be Subjected": The
Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1205
(1988) (observing that the "only question" in Monell "was whether the policy and the outcome it
prescribed were constitutional").
32. As one commentator astutely observes, rarely are modem-day policymakers found "sitting
in a smoke-filled backroom discussing whether to direct local officials to trammel the constitutional
rights of the citizenry." Gilles, supra note 4, at 36-37.
33. 554 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 1273-74.
35. Id. at 1280. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
individual officers on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiff was unable to show that the
officers allegedly violated a clearly established constitutional right. Id. at 1278.
36. See Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 462 F. App'x 831, 833 (10th Cir. 2012). Despite
finding the municipality liable, the jury awarded the plaintiff only nominal damages in the amount of
$1.00. Id.
37. 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999).
38. Id. at 759.
39. Id. at 763.
40. Id. at 763.
41. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).
2014]
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alleged that the City of Cincinnati had violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when police
officers, at the direction of the county prosecutor, forcibly entered the
plaintiff's workplace to arrest two of his employees.43 Unlike the policy
in Monell, the decision of the prosecutor was not made through normal
legislative processes, nor was it intended to serve as a rule of general
applicability to be used in future situations like an official policy. Never-
theless, the Pembaur Court held that "municipal liability may be im-
posed for a single decision by municipal policymakers ... whether or not
that body had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the
future."44
As explained by the Tenth Circuit, Pembaur is a logical extension
of Monell because "[a]n act by a municipality's final policymaking au-
thority is no less an act of the institution than the act of a subordinate
employee conforming to a preexisting policy or custom.A5 Thus, a mu-
nicipality can be found liable even where a final policymaker acts in de-
fiance of a lawful municipal policy or custom.
46
As with claims challenging a formal policy enacted by a municipali-
ty's legislative body, proving that a final policymaker's decision or con-
duct was responsible for the plaintiffs injury "will also determine that
the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the
plaintiff complains.47 The difficulty with this type of claim is showing
that a municipal employee was a final policymaker, that is, one who pos-
sessed "final authority to establish municipal policy."
48
The question of who qualifies as a "final policymaker" is a matter
of state law.49 Because it is a matter of law, courts, not juries, are tasked
with determining whether a municipal employee is empowered to exer-
cise final policymaking authority.50 This makes it more difficult for a
plaintiff to prevail because while looking at state law, the key inquiry is
whether an official has "final, unreviewable discretion to make a deci-
sion or take an action.""
42. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
43. See id. at 472-74.
44. Id. at 480.
45. Simmons v. Uintah Health Care Special Dist., 506 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 2007).
46. Id.
47. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
48. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481.
49. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (plurality opinion). Notably, the
Praprotnik Court was sharply divided on how courts should determine whether a municipal employ-
ee possesses the final authority necessary to trigger municipal liability. See id. at 143 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (suggesting that state law be "the appropriate starting
point, but ultimately the factfinder must determine where such policymaking authority actually
resides, and not simply where the applicable law purports to put it").
50. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th
Cir. 2008).
51. Dempsey v. City of Baldwin, 143 F. App'x 976, 986 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Courts must consider whether: "1) the official is meaningfully con-
strained by policies made by another; 2) the official's decisions are sub-
ject to meaningful review; and 3) the decisions are within the realm of
the official's authority."
52
In contrast to the practical, commonsense view that juries might
take, this formalistic approach to determining the identity of a final poli-
cymaker allows a municipality "to use legal forms to hide the function of
its true policies. 53
The Court's decision in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik54 illustrates
the difficulties that plaintiffs may encounter in asserting the "final poli-
cymaker" theory of municipal liability. In Praprotnik, a city employee
who had suffered an adverse employment action brought a claim against
his supervisors and the City of St. Louis, claiming that the adverse action
55
violated the First Amendment and constituted a denial of due process.
After the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Su-
preme Court reversed on the basis that the plaintiff's supervisors did not
have final policymaking authority because the St. Louis City Charter
identified the Civil Service Commission as the final personnel policy-
maker for the municipality.56 Because the Commission had not itself
denied the plaintiff due process, the Court refused to impose municipal
liability even though there was evidence that the Commission had ac-
corded extreme deference to some lower-level personnel decisions and
failed to review others.57 As Justice Brennan observed in a biting concur-
rence, the plurality "tum[ed] a blind eye to reality" by ignoring the su-
pervisors' de facto decisionmaking authority.58
The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly adhered to this formalistic ap-
proach.59 In Ware v. Unified School District No. 492,60 for example, the
Tenth Circuit held that a superintendent was not the final policymaker of
the school district, refusing to even consider evidence in the record that
52. Id.
53. Milligan-Hitt, 523 F.3d at 1225. The Supreme Court has justified this approach by empha-
sizing a claimant's ability to show an unconstitutional municipal custom. Id. (citing Praprotnik, 485
U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion)). However, as this Article demonstrates, infra Part I.B.4, it is far more
difficult to prevail on a custom theory of relief than by showing an unconstitutional decision or
action by a final policymaker. Thus, municipalities are perversely incentivized to create final poli-
cymaker bodies that do not, in practice, make policy.
54. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
55. Id. at 114-16 (plurality opinion).
56. Id. at 117, 125-29.
57. Id. at 129-30.
58. Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., concurring). As Justice Brennan warned in his Praprotnik concur-
rence, the Court's narrow construction of who qualifies as a final policymaker allows "municipalities
to insulate themselves from liability for the acts of all but a small minority of actual city policymak-
ers." Id. at 132.
59. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2,523 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2008).
60. 902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1990).
2014]
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could "support an inference that the board delegated its final authority. 61
In Jantz v. Muci,62 the Tenth Circuit held that a school principal did not
have final policymaking authority over hiring decisions, despite the dis-
trict court's factual finding that the principal had "virtual de facto hiring
authority. 63 In Milligan-Hitt v. Sheridan County School District No. 2 ,
64
the Tenth Circuit reversed a $160,000 jury verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff on the grounds that the school superintendent was not a final policy-
maker, despite evidence that the school board's "supervision of the su-
perintendent's role in the hiring process was so deferential that he was
functionally unreviewed.
'65
3. Final Policymakers' Ratification of Decisions
A municipality can also be held liable in cases where a final poli-
66cymaker ratifies a subordinate's unconstitutional actions. However, a
final policymaker will be deemed to ratify a subordinate's decision only
where "[t]he final policymaker ... not only approve[s] the decision, but
also adopt[s] the basis for the decision.'67 As the cases in the previous
subsection indicate, final policymakers often approve decisions of subor-
dinates without any real oversight or review, and therefore do not "adopt
the basis for the decision." This creates a perverse incentive for policy-
makers to avoid careful review of subordinates' decisions.
4. Informal Custom Amounting to a Widespread Practice
Under the custom-based theory of municipal liability, a municipali-
ty can be held liable if its employees acted pursuant to the municipality's
custom, even if that custom had never been formally adopted by the mu-
nicipality.68 Unlike written policies that can be affirmatively attributed to
the decisions of governmental law-making entities or final policymakers,
customs are practices of governmental officials that are "not authorized
by written law."
69
To show that a challenged practice is a "custom," the practice must
be so "persistent and widespread" that it "constitutes the standard operat-
ing procedure of the local governmental entity.",70 Municipal custom may
61. Id. at 818 n.l.
62. 976 F.2d 623 (1Oth Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 631.
64. 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008).
65. Id. at 1223, 1229-30.
66. Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 790 (10th Cir. 2010).
67. Dempsey v. City of Baldwin, 143 F. App'x 976, 986 (10th Cir. 2005).
68. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
69. Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). The
Ninth Circuit has explained that the existence of "custom" as a basis for municipal liability is neces-
sary to ensure that municipalities are held responsible for widespread practices that are sufficiently
pervasive so as to have the force of law. Thompson v. City of L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.
1989), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010)).
70. Mitchell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 112 F. App'x 662, 672 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jett
v. DalI. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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also be comprised of "a series of decisions by a subordinate [governmen-
tal] official of which the supervisor [was] aware."
71
Although the Supreme Court recognized the custom theory in Mo-
nell, it has largely ignored these cases since then.72 There are several
cases in the Tenth Circuit, however, where plaintiffs have prevailed un-
der this theory of municipal liability. In Watson v. City of Kansas City,
73
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendant municipality where the plaintiff alleged that the Kansas
City Police Department followed an unwritten custom of responding
differently and affording less protection to victims of domestic violence
than to nondomestic assault victims. 74 In finding that the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence of an unwritten policy or custom to present
the case to a jury, the Tenth Circuit relied largely on statistical evidence
that Kansas City police officers had a significantly lower arrest rate for
domestic assaults than nondomestic assaults.75 The plaintiff also present-
ed evidence that police officers were trained in domestic violence situa-
tions to defuse the situation and to arrest the assailant only as a last re-
sort.
76
As demonstrated by Watson, statistical evidence can be highly pro-
bative in showing the existence of a custom. However, courts are nor-
mally unwilling to acknowledge the existence of an unlawful custom
when the plaintiff relies on statistical evidence alone.77 In Duran v. City
& County of Denver,78 for example, the plaintiff asserted that the Denver
Sheriffs Department maintained "a custom of routinely exonerating of-
ficers who were the subject of excessive force claims, except in cas-
es... where the officer also was found to have 'departed from the truth'
during the investigation of the charges.,79 The plaintiff presented evi-
71. Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
This formulation of "custom" appears similar to the ratification theory discussed previously. See
supra Part 1.B.3. The Tenth Circuit has explained that liability attaches in such cases because "the
supervisor could realistically be deemed to have adopted a policy that happened to have been formu-
lated or initiated by a lower-ranking official." Mitchell, 112 F. App'x at 672 (quoting Praprotnik,
485 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the law again
encourages supervisors to turn a blind eye to the actions of their subordinates because "the mere
failure to investigate the basis of a subordinate's discretionary decisions does not amount to a dele-
gation of policymaking authority." Id. (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
72. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 49 & n. 134. Post-Monell, the Supreme Court has not consid-
ered a single § 1983 case where a plaintiff alleged injury caused by an unconstitutional municipal
custom. Id.
73. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
74. Id. at 695-96.
75. Id. at 695.
76. Id. at 696.
77. See, e.g., Saviour v. Kan. City, No. 90-2430-L, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813, at *14 (D.
Kan. May 15, 1992) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)) ("Although the plaintiffs
statistical evidence is relevant, this court would not find the statistical evidence alone enough to
prove the existence of a policy or custom.").
78. No. 10-cv-01569-REB-KMT, 2012 WL 4478800 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2012).
79. Id. at *2.
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dence establishing that none of the seventy-four excessive force claims
lodged against the Sheriffs Department had been sustained between
2005 and 2007.8o The district court found that this statistical evidence, by
itself, was insufficient to demonstrate that the sheriffs department main-
tained a custom of exonerating officers.8 Even in Watson, the Tenth
Circuit stated that statistical evidence, though relevant, "may not be
enough to prove the existence of a policy or custom."82
Another illustrative example of a custom claim is the recent case of
Ortega v. City & County of Denver.8 3 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Denver Police Department ("DPD") had customs of failing to
adequately investigate citizen complaints of its officers and failing to
discipline its officers for using excessive force.84 In addition to statistical
evidence, the plaintiffs presented deposition testimony from Denver's
former independent monitor that the DPD "had a 'systemic problem' of
officers not being held accountable for their uses of force."85 Additional-
ly, the plaintiffs presented evidence of specific instances in which the
DPD Internal Affairs Bureau failed to adequately investigate citizen
complaints or discipline the offending officer.86 The district court found
that this combination of statistical and testimonial evidence was "suffi-
cient to allow a reasonable juror to find that [the DPD's] failure to ade-
quately investigate citizen's excessive force complaints and to discipline
officers implicated therein was so widespread as to constitute a cus-
tom."
87
Once a plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a municipality's
custom, the plaintiff must then show that the custom created a substantial
risk of serious harm and that the municipality was deliberately indifferent
to that risk. In Bass v. Pottawatomie County Public Safety Center,88 the
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also Trujillo v. Campbell, No. 09-cv-03011-CMA-KLM, 2012 WL 3609747, at
*5-6 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2012) (rejecting "failure to discipline" claim where plaintiff presented only
statistical evidence without additional context); Merman v. City of Camden, 824 F. Supp. 2d 581,
591 (D.N.J. 2010) ("Isolated and without further context, . . . statistical evidence alone may not
justify a jury's finding that a municipal policy or custom authorizes or condones the unconstitutional
acts of police officers."). But see Trujillo, 2012 WL 3609747 (citing Lobato v. Ford, No. 05-cv-
01437-LTB-CBS, Doc. # 266 slip op. at 20 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2007) (concluding that statistical
evidence of lower than average rate of sustained excessive force complaints was sufficient evidence
of a custom or policy of failure to discipline).
82. Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988).
83. 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Colo. 2013).
84. Id. at 1037. Using similar evidence, the plaintiffs were also able to present sufficient
evidence that Denver has a custom of tolerating its officers' "code of silence." Id. at 1040 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 1039.
86. Id. at 1039-40; see also Saviour v. Kan. City, No. 90-2430-L, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8813, at *14 (D. Kan. May 15, 1992) (discussing a plaintiff who had "challenged the City's investi-
gation of excessive force complaints as cursory and indifferent ... [and] proffer[ed] witnesses who
themselves ha[d] filed excessive force complaints that they believe[d] to have been wrongfully
determined by the City to be unfounded").
87. Ortega, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
88. 425 F. App'x 713 (10th Cir. 2011).
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plaintiff brought a lawsuit against a county jail after he was assaulted in
the "drunk pod" by a non-intoxicated detainee.89 The plaintiff demon-
strated that the jail had a custom of permitting its detention officers "to
commingle unclassified, intoxicated detainees with unclassified, non-
intoxicated detainees in the drunk pod when the intake facility was over-
crowded."90 Because this custom violated the State of Oklahoma's Min-
imum Jail Standards for housing intoxicated prisoners as well as the
jail's own written policies, the Tenth Circuit found that the jail's custom
created a substantial risk that intoxicated detainees, such as the plaintiff,
would suffer serious injury.91 The Tenth Circuit also found that the jail
had caused the injury because the injury would not have occurred if the
assailant had not been put in the drunk pod with the plaintiff,92 and that
the jail acted with deliberate indifference because it failed to adequately
monitor the substantial risk that it had created through its custom.
93
5. Municipal Inaction
In City of Canton v. Harris,94 the Supreme Court held that a munic-
ipality could be liable under § 1983 "for constitutional violations result-
ing from its failure to train municipal employees."95 Building upon City
of Canton, the lower federal courts have recognized municipal liability
claims based on other forms of municipal inaction such as failure to su-
pervise, failure to investigate, and failure to discipline.
96
The attraction of a municipal inaction claim is that a plaintiff does
not need to identify an unlawful municipal policy, nor must a plaintiff
locate a final policymaker within the labyrinth of a municipal bureaucra-
cy.97 However, the appeal of this model of liability is tempered by the
"rigorous standards of culpability and causation" that a plaintiff must
satisfy.98
89. Id. at 716.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 720. Notably, the Tenth Circuit held that that the custom was "sufficient in [itself] to
show the substantial risk of serious harm" and the plaintiff therefore did "not have to put forth evi-
dence showing that there had been similar assaults previously at the Jail." Id. at 720 n.2. Thus, a
plaintiff who can show that the existence of an unlawful custom violated written safety policies will
stand a better chance of showing that the custom created a substantial risk of injury.
92. Id. at 722-23.
93. Id. at 720-21.
94. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
95. Id. at 380.
96. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 41-42.
97. Because a plaintiff does not need to identify a policy or final policymaker, municipal
inaction claims are perhaps the most common type of municipal liability claim. See G. Flint Taylor,
Municipal Liability Litigation in Police Misconduct Cases from Monroe to Praprotnik and Beyond, 19
CUMB. L. REv. 447, 452 (1989).
98. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
2014]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
a. Failure to Train/Failure to Supervise
The most common type of municipal inaction claim is where the
plaintiff alleges that the municipality failed to train or supervise its police
officers in the use of force.99 To prevail on this theory, a plaintiff must
first show that the training was in fact inadequate, and then satisfy the
following requirements:
(1) the officers exceeded constitutional limitations on the use of
force; (2) the use of force arose under circumstances that constitute a
usual and recurring situation[] with which police officers must deal;
(3) the inadequate training demonstrates a deliberate indifference on
the part of the city toward persons with whom the police officers
come into contact, and (4) there is a direct causal link between the
constitutional deprivation and the inadequate training. 100
Typically, the most difficult elements to satisfy under this standard are
the third and fourth elements.0 1
In City of Canton, the Supreme Court explained that the deliberate
indifference element requires a plaintiff to show that "the need for
more ... training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in
the violation of the constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need.,102 Although this is a demanding standard,103 a plaintiff can satisfy
this element in a variety of ways. For example, In Allen v. Muskogee,'
°4
the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff demonstrated deliberate indiffer-
ence by presenting expert testimony that "the training was out of synch
with the entire United States in terms of what police are being trained to
do."10 5 In Ortega, the plaintiffs showed deliberate indifference by citing
deposition testimony of the individual officer defendants and their super-
visors that the officers' conduct was in accord with their training.,0 6 Ad-
99. The Tenth Circuit treats allegations of failure to train and failure to supervise the same
way. Whitewater v. Goss, 192 F. App'x 794, 797 (10th Cir. 2006).
100. Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d
1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2000)).
101. See id. at 1228-32 (finding that the plaintiff satisfied the first two elements, but not the
latter two); see also Whitewater, 192 F. App'x at 798-99 (finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the
third element on a failure to train or supervise claim); Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the fourth element on a failure to train or super-
vise claim).
102. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
103. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
104. 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997).
105. Id. at 843 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a practical tip, expert testimony can be
very helpful to show deliberate indifference. See Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 11 -cv-
02394-WJM-CBS, 2013 WL 438579, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2013) ("The Tenth Circuit has also
repeatedly permitted expert testimony on whether departmental policies comply with generally
accepted practices when municipal liability is at stake.").
106. See Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1038-39 (D. Colo. 2013).
Another Colorado district court recently relied on similar evidence to find the City and County of
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ditionally, the plaintiffs presented testimony of Denver's former safety
manager, who testified that he "believed Denver's police officers had
used 'heavy-handed tactics' since 1993" and that such tactics resulted
from the city's training policy.'0 7 Importantly, however, a plaintiff must
show more than deficient training; a plaintiff must also establish that the
municipality knew or should have known that its deficient training was
likely to result in constitutional violations.'
0 8
The fourth element requires a plaintiff to identify a specific defi-
ciency in a municipality's training program that is "closely related to the
ultimate injury. ' ' 109 This element is difficult to prove because a plaintiff
must establish more than "general deficiencies" in training; rather, a
plaintiff must point to a specific deficiency "closely related to his ulti-
mate injury. ' ' ° Essentially, the plaintiff must be able to show that no
constitutional injury would have occurred but for the deficient training."
A plaintiff is more likely to satisfy this causation element where he or
she can show that the training at issue was incorrect rather than inade-
quate. In Allen v. Muskogee, for example, the Tenth Circuit found the
fourth element satisfied where "the officers . . . were trained to do pre-
cisely the wrong thing.""12 Notably, the court observed that "[tlhe causal
link between the officers' [incorrect] training and the alleged constitu-
tional deprivation is more direct than in cases in which officers are not
given enough training to know the correct response to a dangerous situa-
tion.' " 3 Similarly, in Ortega, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the
officers were incorrectly trained, which allowed the reasonable inference
that the plaintiffs would not have been subjected to the same amount of
force if the DPD had provided correct training.'
14
b. Failure to Investigate/Failure to Discipline
A second type of municipal inaction claim is based on a municipali-
ty's failure to investigate or discipline an officer's conduct. This type of
claim has inherent difficulties with respect to the fourth element of cau-
sation."5 In Cordova v. Aragon,16 the Tenth Circuit considered a plain-
Denver was deliberately indifferent to the need for additional training. See Moore v. Miller, No. 10-
cv-0065 I-JLK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *23-25 (May 28, 2014).
107. Id. at 1039.
108. Carrv. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2003).
109. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).
110. Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff "simply
has failed to tie [his] claim to his injuries").
Ill. Gilles, supra note 4, at 46-47.
112. 119 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1997).
113. Id.
114. Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (D. Colo. 2013); see also
Moore v. Miller, No. 10-cv-00651-JLK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *26-27 (May 28, 2014).
115. See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 777 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1056 (10th Cir. 1993)) (rejecting a failure to
discipline claim, noting that "[r]arely if ever is 'the failure of a police department to discipline in a
specific instance ... an adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell'" (omission in original)).
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tiff's claim that the municipality failed to discipline an officer for using
deadly force.117 In affirming the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the municipality, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that "basic prin-
cip[les] of linear time prevent us from seeing how conduct that occurs
after the alleged violation could have somehow caused that violation." "
8
Although the causation element dooms the majority of failure to in-
vestigate or discipline claims, there are rare cases where such claims may
succeed. In Ortega, the plaintiffs were able to satisfy the causation ele-
ment because one of the officers alleged to have committed excessive
force had previously been involved in another excessive force incident.' "
9
Thus, the district court found that a reasonable juror could have found
that the officer would not have inflicted the injuries suffered by the Orte-
ga plaintiffs had he been adequately disciplined for his conduct in the
prior incident. 1
20
c. Failure to Adequately Screen Employee During Hiring
A third category of municipal inaction claims is when a municipali-
ty fails to adequately screen an employee during the hiring process. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that "[c]ases involving constitutional inju-
ries allegedly traceable to an ill-considered hiring decision pose the
greatest risk that a municipality will be held liable for an injury that it did
not cause."'2'1 For a plaintiff to prevail on this type of claim, he or she
must show that "adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would
[have led] a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious
consequence of the decision to hire... would be the deprivation of a
third party's federally protected right," and that adequate screening
would have shown that "this officer was highly likely to inflict the par-
ticular injury suffered by the plaintiff."'' 22 Given this demanding stand-
ard, it is not surprising that such claims are very rarely brought, nor is it
116. 569 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2009).
117. Id. at 1194.
118. Id. (emphasis omitted). However, the Tenth Circuit opined that in the right circumstances,
"[a] subsequent cover-up might provide circumstantial evidence that the city viewed the policy as a
policy in name only and routinely encouraged contrary behavior." Id.; see also Estate of Rice v. City
& Cnty. of Denver, No. 07-cv-01571-MSK-BNB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42381, at *25 (D. Colo.
May 27, 2008) ("[P]ost-incident investigations and discipline are relevant to the issue of policy or
custom.").
119. See Ortega, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
120. Id. Another district court recently found that a demonstrated lack of discipline "is rele-
vant to the legality of the training and/or supervision." Moore v. Miller, No. 10-cv-0065 I-JLK, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *17 n.3 (May 28, 2014). The court reasoned that "if supervisors tacitly
condone illegal conduct by refraining from disciplining wrongdoers, their supervision is not ade-
quate because it lacks meaning or effect." Id.
121. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997).
122. Id. at 411-12.
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surprising that the Tenth Circuit does not appear to have held a munici-
pality liable under an inadequate screening theory of liability. 
2 3
II. EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO PROVING MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Despite the onerous legal standards discussed above, plaintiffs have
found success on municipal liability claims by employing certain careful-
ly crafted strategies. This Part of the Article focuses on concrete litiga-
tion strategies that have proven effective in developing facts that can
establish municipal liability, including specific written discovery re-
quests and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) depositions.
A. Discovery Requests
Plaintiffs must be especially diligent in conducting discovery in
municipal liability cases. Carefully constructed discovery requests, while
potentially requiring production of a significant volume of documents by
governmental agencies, are often of utmost importance in demonstrating
municipal liability. Plaintiffs must overcome courts' reluctance to require
municipal defendants to undertake extensive discovery obligations, as
they often read an unwritten rule of pioportionality into discovery stand-
ards. Additionally, courts will sometimes be reluctant to allow extensive
discovery if the injuries or social import of the plaintiffs claims are con-
sidered insignificant.
Plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate municipal liability are usually
best served by establishing their municipal liability theories early in a
case in order to craft narrow discovery requests targeted at the specific
type of municipal liability claim. Courts will often require attorneys that
are attempting to obtain discovery related to governmental liability to
explain with specificity why the discovery is necessary, contrary to the
spirit of liberal discovery rules. However, courts have allowed broad
discovery where significant public policy interests would be furthered.
124
Generally, "a plaintiff asserting municipal liability under Monell is
entitled not only to factual information concerning [a governmental ac-
tor's] alleged past violations, but also to information concerning his su-
periors' knowledge of those violations and what, if anything, they did
123. See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 772-73 (10th Cir.
2013) (rejecting a hiring-based claim where a background investigation of a police officer "was not
inadequate"); Cacioppo v. Town of Vail, 528 F. App'x 929, 933 (10th Cir. 2013).
124. Fourhorn v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 08-cv-01693-MSK-KLM, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71042, at *13-14 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2009) ("[G]iven the apparent frequency with which
mistaken-identity arrests occurred and the alleged collateral harm caused by the arrests, the issue is
one of great importance in assuring the public that innocent citizens are not being unlawfully and
unnecessarily detained by police. While disclosure of the internal affairs documents at issue may
marginally contribute to timidity in future handling of investigations, disclosure may also have the
opposite effect here. Specifically, it may caution City officials to take similar issues seriously and to
conduct investigations and adopt policies calculated to correct and minimize future mistakes.").
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about them."'25 Documents that contain information regarding statistical
studies and comparative data of the discipline (or lack thereof) of munic-
ipal employees "are directly related to establishing notice and deliberate
indifference."'26 In the same vein, documents relating to independent
investigations are relevant to key issues, such as whether "policymaking
officials had notice of the alleged widespread practice and acted with
deliberate indifference, or tacit approval, towards the previously alleged
violations" by a governmental entity, and are also discoverable. 17 Doc-
ument requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 should be "spe-
cifically tailored to adduce statistical evidence relevant to . . . [the al-
leged] custom of unconstitutional misconduct.'
2 8
District courts in the Tenth Circuit have repeatedly found that evi-
dence of similar citizen incidents can be strong evidence in the prosecu-
tion of a municipal liability claim.129 In Mason v. Stock,130 the court per-
mitted the discovery of evidence into internal affairs files, disciplinary
investigations, and actions.'3' The plaintiff, who had brought a § 1983
claim against a municipal defendant, sought information related to citi-
zen complaints of police misconduct, including "all investigatory files
and case files related to those complaints."'' 32 In finding that the plaintiff
was entitled to discover this information, the court stated that it was
"simply giving plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to come up with evi-
dence that substantiates his 'pattern and practice' claims."',33 The Colora-
do Supreme Court has likewise held that this type of evidence is relevant
to issues regarding the training and supervision of police officers.' 
34
125. Everitt v. Brezzel, 750 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (D. Colo. 1990).
126. Graber v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 09-cv-01029-JLK-MJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82226, at *11 (D. Colo. July 27, 2011).
127. Id. at *10-11.
128. Id. at *9 (holding that a request for a police officer's performance reviews and all of the
Denver Police Department officers' disciplinary records was "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence" (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1))).
129. See, e.g., Schlenker v. City of Arvada, No. 09-cv-01 189-WDM-KLM, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84963, at *4-5 (D. Colo. July 19, 2010) ("Documents and information regarding similar
citizen complaints are clearly relevant to the conduct at issue here, particularly to Plaintiffs munici-
pal liability claim .... Further, because the definition of relevance is broadly construed for purposes
of seeking discovery, Defendant Arvada's position that the discovery sought had to be more closely
'linked' to the conduct at issue here, rather than merely similar, was likewise an unreasonable posi-
tion.").
130. 869 F. Supp. 828 (D. Kan. 1994).
131. Id. at 835.
132. Id. at 830.
133. Id. at 835.
134. Martinelli v. Dist. Ct., 612 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Colo. 1980). The court also stated:
[lInformation relating to: [citizens' complaints] against individual police officers; records
of actions taken in response to citizen complaints; and reports on the officers' handling of
many different situations...
... could be probative of the department's knowledge of specific instances of miscon-
duct on the part of the individual police officers, or their propensities toward such mis-
conduct, if any. The information could also be probative of the department's efforts to
supervise the officers and to minimize the occurrence of such misconduct, and of the de-
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Municipal defendants will often oppose even narrowly-tailored dis-
covery requests by claiming undue burden and asserting that the plaintiff
has embarked on a "fishing expedition." Governmental defendants often
proclaim it is difficult, if not impossible, to produce the requested docu-
ments due to expenses related to the lack of searchability of internal fil-
ing systems, and general difficulties surrounding document management
and retention infrastructure and processes.
However, district courts in the Tenth Circuit have repeatedly reject-
ed these boilerplate arguments, especially when plaintiffs can demon-
strate relevance and need. A municipal defendant asserting undue burden
or expense must show "that the burden or expense is unreasonable in
light of the benefits to be secured from discovery."'1 35 Courts have often
rejected monetary driven undue burden arguments as unavailing. Further,
preventing discovery because of governmental expenses resulting from
any deficiencies in a government's own document management and re-
tention systems may inappropriately incentivize governmental entities to
deliberately maintain poor filing systems of documents relating to its
misconduct.36 "The fact that Defendant maintains records in different
locations, utilizes a filing system that does not directly correspond to the
subjects set forth in Plaintiffs' interrogatory, or that responsive docu-
ments might be voluminous would not suffice to sustain a claim of undue
burden."'
' 37
partment's reasons for retaining individual police officers after the resolution by the Staff
Investigation Bureau of citizen complaints against the officers.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While Martinelli involved a discovery dispute pursuant to the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, Colorado Rule 26(b)(1), like its federal counterpart, provides
that "[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
135. Booth v. Davis, No. 10-4010-RDR, 2011 WL 1627004, at * 10 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2011)
(quoting Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp. v. Midwest Div., Inc., No. 05-2164-MLB-DWB, 2007
WL 3171768, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (holding that the
production of 84,000 to 105,000 pages of documentation, without specificity as to why production
was burdensome, did not constitute an undue burden); see also OneSource Commercial Prop. Servs.,
Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. I0-cv-02273-WJM-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72454, at *6
(D. Colo. July 6, 2011) (citing Klesch & Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 524 (D. Colo.
2003); Schartz v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, No. 95-2491-EEO, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19123, at
*5-6 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1996) ("Discovery, by its very nature, is inherently burdensome to some
extent. The question, however, is whether the discovery [is] unduly burdens[ome] .... ").
136. Graber v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 09-cv-01029-JLK-MJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99594, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2011) ("[W]ere I to reconsider my earlier order because of Defend-
ants' ineptitude, I would be perversely rewarding Defendants for their poor filing system. Further-
more, instead of prodding Defendants to reform their data collection, storage, and retention policies,
I would be providing an incentive to maintain a poor document management system as an excuse for
resisting meaningful participation in discovery.").
137. Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 07-cv-00066-MSK-CBS,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106695, at *17 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2008) (citing Simon v. ProNational Ins.
Co., No. 07-60757-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96318, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1,
2007)); see also Kelly v. Montgomery Lynch & Assocs., No. 1:07-CV-919, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93651, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (rejecting the defendant's claim of undue burden and granting the
plaintiff's motion to compel, notwithstanding the defendant's proffer that its "filing system is not
maintained in a searchable way and the information sought would require 'manually searching
through hundreds of thousands of records"'); Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 328, 331
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In Rehberg v. City of Pueblo,138 the district court entered an order
denying the City of Pueblo's objection to a magistrate judge's discovery
order.'39 Critically, in the underlying order, the magistrate judge had
permitted wide discovery against Pueblo concerning municipal liability,
and found among other things that Pueblo would not be unduly burdened
in producing substantial discovery, even though Pueblo submitted an
affidavit arguing it would be expensive and time consuming to comply
with the Court's discovery order.
40
Obtaining discovery in the possession of the governmental defend-
ant is often required to survive motions for summary judgment in munic-
ipal liability cases. Plaintiffs must establish liability theories and discov-
ery plans early, and be prepared to overcome governmental defendants'
resistance by taking discovery production deficiencies to the court early
in discovery periods and as often as necessary. Attorneys who assert mu-
nicipal liability claims on behalf of their clients must take the pursuit of
discovery seriously and be well-versed in both discovery and municipal
liability standards.
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) Depositions
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), a party may take a deposition of an
organization or other entity through a designee or designees who then
testify on the organization's behalf on designated topics.14 1 This proce-
dure provides a ready venue for a plaintiff to garner testimony that it can
point to as representing the municipality. For example, a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition can be used to determine a municipality's policies, the identi-
ty of a final policymaker, or various facts related to training.1
42
One case demonstrating the effective use of Rule 30(b)(6) deposi-
tions to survive summary judgment on municipal liability is Dalgarn v.
Johnson.143 In that case, the court cited Rule 30(b)(6) testimony in find-
ing that the plaintiff had established the difficult elements of deliberate
indifference and causation in a failure to train claim.'44 Among other
(M.D. Ala. 1991) ("The mere fact that producing documents would be burdensome and expensive
and would interfere with [a] party's normal operations is not inherently a reason to refuse an other-
wise legitimate discovery request.") (granting the plaintiffs motion to compel document discovery
because a company cannot sustain a claim of undue burden by citing deficiencies in its own filing
system or claiming disruption in operations).
138. No. 10-cv-00261-LTB-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87860 (D. Colo. Aug. 9,2011).
139. See id at *2-5.
140. Rehberg v. City of Pueblo, No. I0-cv-00261-LTB-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58776,
at *3-5, *17-18 (D. Colo. June 2, 2011).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
142. Note, however, that a municipality's designation of a person as its representative for
purposes of Rule 30(b)(6) does not mean that the designated individual enjoys final policymaking
authority for the municipality. See Heinrich v. City of Casper, 526 F. App'x 862, 863 (10th Cir.
2013).
143. No. 09-cv-01887-CMA-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98566 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2010).
144. Id. at *30-31.
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admissions, the court found that the defendant "apparently agree[d]" that
its training was inadequate.
45
Several factors can contribute to the effective use of a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition. One factor is which topics the plaintiff lists on the deposition
notice. As a straightforward example, a plaintiff proceeding under a fail-
ure to train theory should list the training at issue as one topic for which
the municipal representative must designate a testifying representative.
Another factor is the timing of the deposition. Rule 30(b)(6) deposi-
tions are generally more useful when taken early in a case, because they
can provide insight into the workings of a defendant organization or enti-
ty, which lays the foundation for further factual development. In the case
of a municipal liability claim, a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition taken early can
help to form the strongest municipal liability theory. 
46
III. CHALLENGES, BENEFITS, AND A PATHWAY FORWARD
The strategies presented above may give plaintiffs additional tools
to succeed in surviving summary judgment on municipal liability claims,
but the truth remains that many plaintiffs' attorneys are discouraged from
bringing such claims due to the standards imposed by federal courts.
Courts have enforced these stringent standards with sometimes open
hostility to plaintiffs' claims.147 Plaintiffs are further discouraged by
practical and procedural considerations such as the potential for bifurca-
tion and lack of economic incentive.
Against this legal backdrop, it is important to remember that the
purpose of § 1983 is "to provide a federal forum for litigants who ha[ve]
been deprived of their constitutional rights."'4s The Supreme Court has
also aptly observed that adequate damages remedies are vitally important
to protect our citizenry's "cherished constitutional guarantees, and the
importance of assuring [their] efficacy is only accentuated when the
wrongdoer is the institution that has been established to protect the very
rights it has transgressed.'' 149 In light of these purposes and the im-
portance of adequate remedies, the courts should move the standards and
requirements for municipal liability toward a legal standard that is more
unified with these goals.
145. Id. at*30 & n.51.
146. For a recent example of the detriment of waiting too long to take a Rule 30(b)(6) deposi-
tion, see Doty v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield, No. 12-cv-01340-PAB-MJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96324 (D. Colo. July 10, 2013), in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for leave to amend his
complaint "to conform to what Plaintiff argues is newly-discovered evidence obtained during the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition taken on May 16, 2013." Id. at *3.
147. See Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1223
(10th Cir. 2008)_ (suggesting that municipalities are "tempting targets for lawsuits" because they
"have more money and no immunity.").
148. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 76 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
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A. Courts' Hostility Toward Municipal Liability Claims
Federal courts have enforced the demanding standards for munici-
pal liability with such rigor that it has sometimes resulted in expressions
of open skepticism and even hostility. Ever since the Supreme Court first
rejected respondeat superior as a standard for municipal liability, courts
have been hyper-vigilant about protecting municipalities from this form
of liability and have applied heightened standards of causation and cul-
pability where the municipality did not directly inflict an injury.150 The
Supreme Court has justified these "rigorous standards" as necessary "to
ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
employee."'
' 51
These high standards have resulted in a scarcity of successful mu-
nicipal liability claims in the federal courts.152 For example, since Mo-
nell, the Supreme Court has not directly considered a single § 1983 case
where a plaintiffs alleged injury was caused by an unconstitutional mu-
nicipal custom,153 and cases in the Tenth Circuit are likewise few and far
between. 1
54
The evolution of these uniquely stringent standards has led to a per-
ception among civil rights attorneys that courts "simply do not under-
stand, or are hostile to, Monell claims."'55 This perception is demonstrat-
ed by statements, such as the Tenth Circuit's observation, that municipal-
ities "are tempting targets for lawsuits when municipal officials have
erred" because municipalities "have more money" than the officials
themselves.56 As demonstrated in the following subpart, such statements
are not only alarming in their lack of empathy for victims of civil rights
violations but also divorced from reality.
B. Other Challenges for Municipal Liability Plaintiffs
Even if plaintiffs do succeed in meeting the Supreme Court's high
municipal liability requirements, they face a number of practical and
procedural hurdles to obtaining a jury award. Contrary to the Tenth Cir-
150. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) ("Where a court fails to
adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into re-
spondeat superior liability.").
151. Id. at 405.
152. See infra app. 1.
153. Gilles, supra note 4, at 49 & n. 134.
154. See id at 21 (observing that "the truly animating forces of modem day police misconduct
are... pervasive unwritten codes of conduct followed by rank and file officers that regularly abridge
the constitutional rights of the citizenry").
155. Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 569 (1993) (quoting Taylor, supra note 97, at 464)
(discussing interviews with plaintiff civil rights attorneys about some of the reasons that plaintiffs do
not bring Monell claims, and cautioning litigators to "be aware of these sobering realities before
filing or pursuing a Monell claim in a police misconduct case").




cuit's dismissive observation, plaintiffs often have little economic incen-
tive to bring Monell claims. Unlike with claims against individual munic-
ipal employees, plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages against gov-
ernmental entities.157 Further, municipal employees are often indemnified
for their constitutional torts,158 so municipalities commonly bear the cost
of their employees' constitutional torts, regardless of whether they are
sued directly.159 Thus, plaintiffs in fact have little financial incentive to
pursue municipal liability claims rather than undertake the more attaina-
ble task of suing individual officers.
Procedural hurdles may additionally prevent plaintiffs from ever
getting to the point of collecting damages from municipalities. In particu-
lar, courts have shown an increasing willingness to bifurcate claims
against officers from claims against a municipality.'60 Their principal
reasoning is that a plaintiff must prove the underlying constitutional
harm committed by the officer to proceed against the governmental enti-
ty, 161 so the plaintiff should have to establish individual liability "before
turning to the more burdensome and time-consuming task of litigating
the Monell claim. 162
The result of bifurcation is to make the task of proving municipal li-
ability even more onerous. In bifurcated cases, plaintiffs must bear the
costs of undergoing two separate trials, or worse, two lengthy and bur-
densome discovery periods.63 In the first trial against the officers, plain-
tiffs must overcome "pro-police" juries.1 64 Furthermore, as some courts
have observed, "[t]here is a danger that bifurcation may deprive plaintiffs
of their legitimate right to place before the jury the circumstances and
atmosphere of the entire cause of action which they have brought into the
157. See Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1307 (10th Cir. 2003) ("The fact that
municipalities are immune from punitive damages does not... mean that individual officials sued in
their official capacity are likewise immune."); Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1210 (10th
Cir. 1998) ("[M]unicipalities are not liable for punitive damages under § 1983."). But see Murphy v.
Spring, No. 13-CV-96-TCK-PJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130231, at *18-19 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 12,
2013) (observing that Youren "has been called into question by lower courts" and criticized for
lacking support).
158. Gilles, supra note 4, at 30 & n.52 (referencing a list of state statutes which provide for
indemnification).
159. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (finding that "no case ... showed that an individual official
had bome the cost of an adverse constitutional tort judgment" in a survey of cases where payments
to victims of constitutional wrongs were recorded).
160. See Colbert, supra note 155, at 552-60 (discussing the trend of claim bifurcation in
§ 1983 litigation in certain U.S. cities). But see Await v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142, 2012 WL
1161500, at * 10 n.2 (N.D. I11. Apr. 9, 2012) ("It is clear that the weight of authority holds that bifur-
cation is now heavily disfavored.").
161. See City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
162. Ojeda-Beltran v. Lucio, No. 07 C 6667, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54116, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
July 16, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Colbert, supra note 155, at 504.
164. Id. at 548-49.
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court, replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere.'65 Because of
the additional hurdles it creates, bifurcation has been referred to as an
"'end-around' method for avoiding Supreme Court law upholding sec-
tion 1983 municipal liability" and "a nearly infallible defense strate-
gy.",
166
C. Importance and Benefits of Municipal Liability Claims
Despite the hurdles of bringing municipal liability claims, plaintiffs
nonetheless have many good reasons to bring such claims, which helps
explain why practitioners in the Tenth Circuit have begun bringing Mo-
nell claims with greater frequency.167 One such benefit is that in select
cases, Monell provides a path to recovery for plaintiffs stymied by the
doctrine of qualified immunity. To overcome qualified immunity and
prevail on a § 1983 claim against an individual governmental official, a
plaintiff usually must show that the constitutional right at issue was
"clearly established" in addition to showing that the defendant deprived
him or her of a constitutional right. 68 Because municipalities do not en-
joy qualified immunity,169 a municipality can be held liable for an of-
ficer's constitutional torts where the constitutional right at issue was not
clearly established. 1
70
However, the greater incentive for pursuit of municipal liability lies
in the potential impact of favorable rulings on a broader societal level.
For many plaintiffs, the potential of preventing future civil rights viola-
tions is significantly more important than receiving monetary compensa-
tion for their own injuries. To that end, many plaintiffs request (and re-
ceive) injunctive relief in municipal liability cases that may have no di-
rect benefit to an individual plaintiff. 71 For example, the settlements
165. Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 385 F. Supp. 2d 626, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2004)
(quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Marcum v. Scioto Cnty., No. 1: 10-cv-790, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93042, at *8
(S.D. Ohio July 5, 2012).
166. Colbert, supra note 155, at 507, 509.
167. As of February 25, 2014, a search on LEXIS for "municipal liability" or "Monell" in the
District of Colorado returns 602 hits, with 473 of the hits (78.6%) from cases that were filed after
January 1, 2007.
168. See, e.g., Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez v.
Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
169. See Walker v. City ofOrem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).
170. See Bass v. Pottawatomie Cnty. Pub. Safety Ctr., 425 F. App'x 713, 718 (10th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting a municipality's inconsistent verdict argument where the jury found the municipality liable
but that the individual officer was protected by qualified immunity); Christensen v. Park City Mun.
Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the individual officers were protected by
qualified immunity but that "[t]he defense of qualified immunity is not available to a municipality
such as Park City"); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[T]here is
nothing anomalous about allowing ... a suit [against the city] to proceed when immunity [based on
a lack of clearly established law] shields the individual defendants.").
171. See, e.g., Hall v. Terrell, No. 08-cv-00999-DME-MEH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48870, at
*34 (D. Colo. June 10, 2009) (involving a female inmate who, after being brutally raped by a
prison guard, filed a § 1983 lawsuit seeking "actual, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive remedies"). Illustrating the societal benefit of municipal liability claims, Hall "prompted
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resulting from Estate of Rice v. City & County of Denver172 required the
Denver Health Medical Center and the City & County of Denver to
change the policies and customs that had contributed to the death of the
female detainee. 1
73
When municipalities are held liable for constitutional harms, they
are forced to confront their unconstitutional policies and customs and
develop comprehensive responses so that the violations do not reoccur.
74
Unfavorable jury verdicts "expose municipalities to costly, indeterminate
liability during these times of fiscal austerity, making reform of police
practices an economic, as well as a political, imperative."'' 75 The negative
publicity resulting from a municipality being put on trial can serve as a
similarly strong deterrent.7 6 Further, municipalities "possess the re-
sources and broad vantage point with which to identify the particular
deficiencies, and [to] take appropriate corrective action.'
177
IV. CONCLUSION
During the legislative debate preceding passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, now codified as § 1983,178 Representative Samuel Shella-
barger of Ohio, the drafter of the Act, stated:
the state prison system to change some of its practices." Andrea Dukakis, Prisoner Abuse Case
Leads to Big Changes, COLO. PUB. RADIO (May 26, 2010),
http://www.cpr.org/article/Prisoner Abuse CaseLeads toBig Changes.
172. No. 07-cv-01571-MSK-BNB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42381 (D. Colo. May 27, 2008).
173. See, e.g., Felisa Cardona, Settlement Reached in Jail Death: Denver Health to Pay $4
Million to Family of Emily Rae Rice, DENy. POST, May 30, 2008, at Al (noting that the settlement of
Rice's wrongful death case included a mandate that the hospital institute new procedures for check-
ing patients' vital signs); Daniel J. Chacon, City to Pay $3 Million in Emily Rice Wrongful Death
Lawsuit, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov. 13, 2008,
http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/nov/1 3/denver-pay-3-million-emily-rice-wrongful-
death-law (discussing the settlement of Rice's wrongful death case, which included Denver Health
policy changes known as "Emily's Rights," as well as "23 changes in protocol and procedures" at
the Denver jail (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, in Hall v. Terrell, the Department of
Corrections "agreed to install more security cameras in the area where the sexual assaults took
place." Gary Hunter, Sexual Abuse by Prison and Jail Staff Proves Persistent, Pandemic, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS, May 15, 2009, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/21225_displayArticle.aspx (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
174. See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 155, at 502 ("Jury verdicts holding municipalities liable for
depriving citizens of their constitutional rights serve to effectively short-circuit official toleration and
condonation of longstanding unconstitutional police practices." (footnote omitted)); Christina B.
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 49-50 (1980) (observing that holding local
governments liable for constitutional harms inspires the types of "systemic changes" needed to fix
"systemic problems" within local governments (internal quotation marks omitted)).
175. Colbert, supra note 155, at 502 (footnotes omitted).
176. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 88 ("[I]nstitutional change is induced not only by the threat of
monetary penalties, but for other reasons, including a defendant's desire to avoid adverse publicity,
[as well as] the cost and burden of litigation .... Such behavior-modifying factors should have an
even stronger effect in the public law sphere, where municipal liability claims based on unconstitu-
tional customs can implicate high profile social issues, such as police brutality, corruption, or cover-
ups.").
177. Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2018-19 (1998).
178. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978).
2014]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty
and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authoriz-
ing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. It would be
most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of
interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own Su-
preme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is
wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the
words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes and
constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and give
remedies for their wrongs to all the people.
179
The Supreme Court has also recognized the remedial purposes
served by § 1983 and the deterrent effect it has on constitutional depriva-
tions. 18 It is no wonder that municipal liability claims have been de-
scribed as representing "the greatest hope for curbing the excessive use
of force by police officers."'
' 81
Yet, clearly there is a disconnect between the potential societal ben-
efit that can arise from successful municipal liability claims and the vari-
ous barriers that courts have erected to prevent plaintiffs from pursuing
such claims. It is important to understand that the current legal standard
reflects the courts' unyielding fidelity to the principle that municipalities
should not be subject to respondeat superior liability. 1
82
This Article does not assert hat respondeat superior liability is nec-
essarily the appropriate standard for municipal liability claims, although
there is persuasive scholarship to that effect.'83 But this Article does
question why such a stringent standard is necessary to protect munici-
palities from respondeat superior liability. After all, "Monell confines
cities' liability for compensatory damages more tightly than the common
law restricts private employers' liability for punitive damages."',84 If
avoiding respondeat superior liability is the animating force behind the
Court's jurisprudence, the Court has failed to explain why lesser stand-
ards of causation and culpability would not suffice. For example, em-
ploying a standard of gross negligence or recklessness would avoid re-
spondeat superior liability while simultaneously making it more feasible
for plaintiffs to pursue municipal liability claims.'
85
179. Id. at 684 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68 (1871)).
180. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980).
181. Colbert, supra note 155, at 502.
182. See Bd. of Cnry. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) ("Where a court fails to
adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into re-
spondeat superior liability.... Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless delib-
erate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights."); Pem-
baur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
183. See Achtenberg, supra note 15, at 2191-92.
184. Id. at 2193.
185. See Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between §
1983 Municipal Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. 153, 171
n.75 (2011) (describing the difference between gross negligence and deliberate indifference).
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In any event, some relaxation of the idiosyncratically demanding
legal standards would permit plaintiffs to challenge the root cause of
many constitutional deprivations and more robustly deter the scourge of
constitutional deprivations on society. In the meantime, plaintiffs and
their attorneys must forge ahead to overcome the currently burdensome
standards to further societal remedies and to uphold their individual con-
stitutional rights.
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APPENDIX:
TENTH CIRCUIT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CASES FROM THE PAST TEN
YEARS
1 86




Ledbetter v. City of Final policy- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Topeka, 318 F.3d maker for summary that municipal judges do not
1183 (10th Cir. judgment act as policymakers.
2003).
Zuniga v. City of Failure to Denied motion Reversed district court. Held
Midwest City, 68 F. train for judgment as that there was insufficient
App'x 160 (10th Cir. a matter of law evidence to support munici-
2003). under Fed. R. pal liability because no link-
Civ. P. 50(a)187  age between alleged lack of
training and unconstitutional
search and seizure.
Dubbs v. Head Start, Formal policy Granted motion Reversed district court.
Inc., 336 F.3d 1194 for summary Held that a private entity act-
(10th Cir. 2003). judgment ing under color of state law
could be held liable for per-
forming medical examina-
tions on children on the basis
of forms that would not be
understood by a reasonable
person as providing parental
consent.
Carr v. Castle, 337 Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. train for summary that the plaintiff failed to
2003). prove municipal liability be-
cause he failed to show delib-
erate indifference by the mu-
nicipality, nor could he show
a direct causal link.
Ferencich v. Merritt, Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
79 F. App'x 408 cy; Informal for summary that there was no evidence
(10th Cir. 2003). custom judgment that sexual harassment of
186. This table omits cases where the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on municipal
liability claims on the basis that the plaintiffs had not met the first element of showing that there was
an underlying constitutional basis. This table also omits cases where pro se plaintiffs filed frivolous
municipal liability claims and the Tenth Circuit did not engage in any instructive analysis.




stemmed from county policy
or custom, such as a policy of
tolerating sexual harassment.
Douglas v. Beaver None Dismissed com- Affirmed district court. Held
Ctny. Sch. Dist. Bd., plaint that the plaintiff had not suf-
82 F. App'x 200 ficiently alleged that any cus-
(10th Cir. 2003). toms or policies of the school
district caused the alleged
constitutional violation.
Wright v. City of St. Formal poli- Granted motion Vacated district court's
Francis, 95 F. App'x cy; Final poli- for summary order and remanded with
915 (10th Cir. 2004). cymaker judgment respect to one claim against
city. Held that the chief of
police's false statements
about violent tendencies of
plaintiffs may have contribut-
ed to unlawful search.
Gonzales v. City of Formal poli- Dismissed com- Reversed district court.
Castle Rock, 366 cy; Informal plaint Held that the plaintiff's pro-
F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. custom cedural due process rights
2004), rev'd, 545 were violated where munici-
U.S. 748 (2005). pality did not protect the
plaintiff after issuing a pro-
tection order. The Supreme
Court then reversed the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that
there had been a constitution-
al violation.
Roberson v. Pin- Formal policy Dismissed mu- Reversed in part and re-
nacol Assurance, 98 nicipal liability manded to district court.
F. App'x 778 (10th claim Held that the plaintiff had
Cir. 2004). alleged sufficient facts for the
district court to consider her
claim that Pinnacol, a statuto-
rily created insurance compa-
ny, violated her constitutional
rights through the acts of its
authorized agents who carried
out Pinnacol's decision to
terminate her benefits.
Donohue v. Hoey, Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
109 F. App'x 340 cy; Failure to for summary that the disclosure of nude
(10th Cir. 2004). train judgment photographs of the plaintiff
by a police lieutenant was not
caused by any policy because
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the plaintiff had not submit-
ted evidence of any unconsti-
tutional policy.
Mitchell v. City & Informal cus- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Ctny. of Denver, 112 tom for summary that there was not sufficient
F. App'x 662 (10th judgment evidence of custom where
Cir. 2004). plaintiff submitted evidence
of racial discrimination by
only one supervisor toward
him and one other minority
employee.
Dempsey v. City of Final policy- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Baldwin, 143 F. maker; Ratifi- for summary that the mayor was not a final
App'x 976 (10th Cir. cation judgment policymaker on personnel
2005). matters, nor did the city
council-which was the poli-
cymaker-ratify the mayor's
discipline of municipal em-
ployees.
Beedle v. Wilson, Final policy- Dismissed com- Reversed district court in
422 F.3d 1059 (10th maker plaint part. Held that the plaintiff
Cir. 2005). had made sufficient allega-
tions that executives of hospi-
tal were official policymakers
for defendant hospital and the
hospital could therefore be
held liable for First Amend-
ment retaliation claim.
Walker v. City of Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Orem, 451 F.3d train for summary that there was insufficient
1139 (10th Cir. judgment evidence of policy that offic-
2006). ers could retain witnesses for
unreasonable amounts of
time, nor was there any evi-
dence that any of the officers
were final policymakers for
purposes of municipal liabil-
ity.
Whitewater v. Goss, Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
192 F. App'x 794 cy; Failure to for summary that the plaintiff had failed to
(10th Cir. 2006). train; Failure judgment show that possible violation
to supervise of his constitutional rights
was caused by police depart-
ment policy or failure to
train.
Novitsky v. City of Formal policy Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
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Aurora, 491 F.3d for summary that an officer's discretion in
1244 (10th Cir. judgment exercise of particular func-
2007). tions did not give rise to mu-
nicipal liability based on the
exercise of that discretion.
Darr v. Town of Formal policy Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Telluride, 495 F.3d for summary that a municipality's negli-
1243 (10th Cir. judgment gent supervision of citizens'
2007). advisory board could not
form the basis for money
damages against municipality
because negligence is not a
basis for liability under §
1983.
Simpson v. Univ. of Failure to Granted motion Reversed district court.
Colo. Boulder, 500 train; Failure for summary Held that there was sufficient
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. to supervise judgment evidence to show that the
2007). University of Colorado was
deliberately indifferent to the
need to train player-hosts of
football recruits. The plain-
tiffs claim was brought un-
der Title IX, relying on mu-
nicipal liability law.
Simmons v. Uintah Final policy- Granted motion Reversed district court.
Health Care Special maker for summary Held that a final policymaker
Serv. Dist., 506 F.3d judgment who does not follow official
1281 (10th Cir. policy still binds the munici-
2007). pality.
Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. Final policy- Jury verdict for Reversed district court on
of Trs. of Sheridan maker plaintiff municipal liability claim.
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. Held that a superintendent
2, 523 F.3d 1219 was not final policymaker for
(10th Cir. 2008). the school district and the
district could therefore not be
held liable for conduct of
superintendent.
Boyett v. Cnty. of Formal policy Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Wash., 282 F. App'x for summary that the plaintiff failed to
667 (10th Cir. 2008). judgment prove that a jail had unconsti-
tutional policies and, even if
he could, failed to show cau-
sation.
Carney v. City & Informal cus- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Ctny. of Denver, 534 tom for summary that the statistical evidence of
F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. judgment the racial and gender makeup
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2008). of the Denver Police Depart-
ment produced by plaintiff
was insufficient to show cus-
tom of discrimination.
Christensen v. Park Formal policy Granted motion Reversed district court on
City Mun. Corp., for summary municipal liability claim
554 F.3d 1271 (10th judgment and remanded. Held that an
Cir. 2009). officer's enforcement of city
ordinances regarding the dis-
play and sale of artwork in a
public park could trigger mu-
nicipal liability.
Moss v. Kopp, 559 Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. cy; Final poli- for summary that an officer's allegedly
2009). cymaker judgment unconstitutional conduct in a
single incident could not be
attributed to the municipality
because the plaintiff could
not show the officer's con-
duct was taken pursuant to a
decision made by a final poli-
cymaker.
Cordova v. Aragon, Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
569 F.3d 1183 (10th train; Failure for summary that there was insufficient
Cir. 2009). to discipline judgment evidence that a municipality
insufficiently trained its of-
ficers on the use of deadly
force, nor did the municipali-
ty's failure to discipline of-
ficer give rise to municipal
liability.
Nielander v. Bd. of Final policy- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Cnty. Comm'rs, 582 maker for summary that a county prosecutor was
F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. judgment not a municipal policymaker
2009). because, under Kansas law,
county attorneys are officials
of the state, not the county.
Brammer-Hoelter v. Formal policy Granted motion Reversed district court in
Twin Peaks Charter for summary part. Held that a First
Acad., 602 F.3d judgment Amendment retaliation claim
1175 (10th Cir. against a charter academy
2010). survived for some plaintiffs,
but held that other bases for
municipal liability were




J.M. ex rel. Morris v. Failure to Jury verdict for Affirmed district court.
Hilldale Indep. Sch. investigate plaintiff Held that a school district
Dist. No. 1-29, 397 could be held liable for fail-
F. App'x 445 (10th ing to investigate abuse of
Cir. 2010). student by teacher because
superintendent and principal
were informed about poten-
tial abuse and failed to act on
the information.
Porro v. Barnes, 624 Failure to Granted Affirmed district court. Held
F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. train motion for that a municipality's alleged
2010). summary j udg- violation of prophylactic fed-
ment eral policy does not neces-
sarily demonstrate deliberate
indifference to the plaintiffs
constitutional rights.
Bryson v. City of Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Oklahoma City, 627 train; Failure for summary that the plaintiff presented
F.3d 784 (10th Cir. to supervise judgment insufficient evidence of mu-
2010). nicipality's deliberate indif-
ference in failing to train fo-
rensic chemists where the
plaintiff was exonerated by
DNA evidence after seven-
teen years of incarceration for
a rape and kidnapping he did
not commit.
Bass v. Pottawato- Formal poli- Jury verdict for Affirmed district court.
mie Cnty. Pub. Safe- cy; Informal plaintiff Held that a jail's policy or
ty Ctr., 425 F. App'x custom custom of permitting jailors




indifference to the safety of
non-intoxicated detainees,
such as the plaintiff.
Coffey v. McKinley Formal policy Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Ctny., 504 F. App'x (failure to for summary that the plaintiff failed to
715 (10th Cir. 2012). enact policy) judgment show deliberate indifference
where claim was based on
jail's alleged lack of adequate
fourteen day medical proce-
dures policy.
Layton v. Bd. of Formal poli- Granted motion Reversed district court.
Ctny. Comm'rs, 512 cy; Final poli- for summary Held that the plaintiff pre-
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F. App'x 861 (10th cymaker judgment sented sufficient evidence to
Cir. 2013). survive summary judgment
on whether a county's polices
regarding medical care pro-
vided to detainees evidenced
the county's deliberate indif-
ference to conditions at jail.
Schneider v. City of Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Grand Junction Po- train; Failure for summary that the plaintiff failed to
lice Dep't, 717 F.3d to investigate; judgment show deliberate indifference
760 (10th Cir. 2013). Failure to by a municipality regarding
discipline; failure to train, failure to in-
Failure to vestigate, failure to disci-
supervise; pline, and inadequate hiring
Inadequate claims where a police officer
hiring had raped the plaintiff. Held
that the plaintiff also failed to
establish causation with re-
gard to failure to supervise
claim.
Bailey v. Kerns, 527 Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
F. App'x 680 (10th cy; Failure to for summary that any medical negligence
Cir. 2013). train judgment or deliberate indifference
resulted from municipal em-
ployees' decisions, not from
municipal policies, and that
there was no pattern of con-
duct that would have put mu-
nicipality on notice that its
training of medical staff was
inadequate.
Cacioppo v. Town of Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Vail, 528 F. App'x train; Inade- for summary that the plaintiff's hybrid,
929 (10th Cir. 2013). quate hiring; judgment three-tiered theory failed to
Ratification show deliberate indifference.
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